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Some of the reasons one acts on in joint action are shared with fellow participants. But others 
are proprietary: reasons of one’s own that have no direct practical significance for other 
participants. The compatibility of joint action with proprietary reasons serves to distinguish 
the former from other forms of collective agency; moreover, it is arguably a desirable feature 
of joint action. Advocates of “team reasoning” link the special collective intention individual 
participants have when acting together with a distinctive form of practical reasoning that 
purports to put individuals in touch with group or collective reasons. Such views entail the 
surprising conclusion that one cannot engage in joint action for proprietary reasons. Suppose 
we understand the contrast between minimal and robust forms of joint action in terms of the 
extent to which participants act on proprietary reasons as opposed to shared reasons. Then, 
if the team reasoning view of joint intention and action is correct, it makes no sense to talk 
of minimal joint action. As soon as the reason for which one participates is proprietary, then 
one is not, on this view, genuinely engaged in joint action. 
 




10.1. Proprietary Reasons 
 
Joint action involves the sharing of reasons and aims amongst those engaged in it. This is a 
natural thought, at least if we understand intentional action in terms of the reasons or aims 
that rationalize or make sense of it.1  For example, the raising of my arm is intentional 
insofar as it is done toward some end, or for a reason – such as getting the attention of the 
speaker in order to ask a question. The same would seem to be true for joint or collective 
action: our φ-ing is intentional insofar as it is directed toward an end, or done for a reason. 
And since we’re φ-ing together, the reason or aim that makes the φ-ing intentional 
presumably is something that we share. Thus, there is in joint action a meeting of minds, a 
sharing of the reasons and goals that makes what we’re doing together the intentional act 
that it is. 
 
But how much sharing of reasons can there be? More importantly for my purposes here, 
how much sharing must there be? How little overlap or convergence of reasons is necessary 
for joint action of a minimal sort? 
 
You might think that some of the subsidiary aims that an individual has in connection with a 
joint endeavor – those she adopts as part of how she goes about making her contribution to 
it – must inevitably be shared with fellow participants. For example, if we share a ride 
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downtown, we cannot each aim to get there using incompatible routes. At least, we would 
seem to be subject to some sort of rational criticism were we engaged in the joint action and 
yet failing to reconcile our differences about how to go about it.2  
 
What about our reasons or aims for going downtown in the first place? It would seem that 
here there is room for significant divergence of aims. Maybe I want to get to the museum, 
and you want to get to the ballpark, both of which are downtown. Sharing a ride doesn’t 
seem to require that we share reasons for doing so. Call a reason or aim had in connection 
with engaging in joint action proprietary when it is not shared with other participants. My 
proprietary reason (getting to the museum) has immediate or direct normative significance 
for what I do; it is, after all, my reason for action. But insofar as it is proprietary, it doesn’t 
have that sort of immediate significance for you.3  
 
Joint action does not preclude proprietary reasons on the part of some or all of the 
participants. Bratman articulates this point forcefully when he says 
 
The sharing of intention need not involve commonality in each agent’s reasons for 
participating in the sharing. You and I can have a shared intention to paint the 
house together, even though I participate because I want to change the color 
whereas you participate because you want to remove the mildew…though we 
participate for different reasons, our shared intention nevertheless establishes a 
shared framework of commitments; and this can happen even if these differences in 
our reasons are out in the open…much of our sociality is partial in the sense that it 
involves sharing in the face of – in some cases, public – divergence of background 
reasons for the sharing. (Bratman 2014, 91) 
 
Bratman points out that such a conception of shared intention and joint action resonates 
with a liberal pluralism: 
 
It is an important fact about our sociality that we manage to share intentions and act 
together in the face of substantial differences of reasons for which we participate. 
We work together, we play together, and we engage in conversations together even 
given substantial background differences in our reasons for participation and our 
reasons for various sub-plans. This is especially characteristic of a pluralistic, liberal 
culture. This is the pervasiveness of partiality in our sociality. It is a virtue of the basic 
thesis that it makes room, in a theoretically natural way, for this pervasiveness of 
partiality.  (Bratman 2014, 91) 
 
From a more narrowly action-theoretic perspective, it seems that the compatibility of 
proprietary reasons with joint action is a mark of the phenomenon that is our focus: that of 
distinct individual agents coming together to act jointly. It stands in contrast to a form of 
agency exercised by some highly integrated group – something that is arguably more like 
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an individual agent, albeit on a large scale. Precluding proprietary reasons would, if 
anything, undermine joint action and leave in its stead some more monolithic form of 
individual agency. 
 
So there are things to be said in favor of the compatibility (and perhaps even the necessity) 
of proprietary reasons for joint action. These reasons notwithstanding, I think it will be 
illuminating to explore some considerations that could lead us to think otherwise. Might 
there be at least some tension between joint action and the presence of proprietary reasons? 
 
 
10.2. Against Propriety 
 
For a start, consider how Tuomela criticizes Bratman for neglecting the collective reason that 
is necessary for joint action. He says (2007, 100–101) that on Bratman’s analysis “The 
agents have their personal intentions on the basis of their private reasons.” Tuomela objects 
that this “does not entail a full-blown group reason, namely, that the agents have their 
intentions of the form “I intend that we J” (for each participant) necessarily because of a 
group reason satisfying the Collectivity Condition.” Tuomela says “Formulated for the 
special case of goal satisfaction, [the Condition] necessarily connects the members as 
follows. Necessarily (as based on group construction of a goal as the group’s goal), the goal 
is satisfied for a member if and only if it is satisfied for all other members.” (Tuomela, 4). 
 
It’s clear enough that Tuomela objects to the absence in Bratman’s account of a common 
or shared reason as a requirement on joint action; indeed, Tuomela speaks of a ‘group 
reason’ requirement on joint action (4, 13). It’s less clear, however, what his attitude is 
toward proprietary reasons and whether their presence is somehow antithetical to joint 
action. Do Tuomela’s group reason and collectivity conditions entail anything about what 
proprietary reason an agent may or may not have? Must proprietary reasons be set aside in 
the ‘we’-mode, which for Tuomela is the perspective of participants in robust, paradigmatic 
forms of joint agency? Or does adopting the perspective of the we-mode simply add group 
considerations to the personal or proprietary reasons one may already have for 
participating? How easily do shared or collective reasons for our φ-ing sit along side of 
proprietary reasons for engaging in joint action? 
 
Some of what Tuomela says suggests that proprietary reasons are not compatible with joint 
action. Thus, his collectivity condition indicates that “the depersonalization that occurs in 
social groups shows up in the basic structure of group life (in its we-mode content) and thus 
is not a mere contingent feature of groups” (Tuomela 2007, 50; see also 4, 10, 48). It’s not 
entirely clear what is meant by ‘depersonalization’, but it connotes that personal or 
proprietary reasons are distinct from group reasons (4), and set aside in joint action. If so, 
Tuomela would be insisting not only on the necessity of group reason, but also the 
exclusion of proprietary reasons. Tuomela confirms this sort of reading with a passage that 
contrasts someone acting in we mode and hence for some collective reason with someone 
who outwardly behaves that way but acts for a very different sort of reason. Thus, 
 
“a member can instrumentally function (or, better, quasi-function) as a group 
member just by doing his “work,” even if not for the ethos-serving reason (that 
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satisfies the Collectivity Condition). He would then, so to speak, be exhibiting the 
right actions, but his reason for performing a group-task T would be, roughly, the I-
mode reason expressible by “I perform T because it is conducive to my personal 
interests” and not the we-mode reason expressible by “I perform T at least in part 
because it is my duty and furthers, or at least does not contradict, the group’s 
ethos.” (Tuomela 2007, 50) 
 
What seems to be important for Tuomela is that in paradigmatic joint action, one is acting 
for a group reason. And this is contrasted with other cases where one is acting for some 
personal reason. Perhaps one can possess personal reasons, but as far as robust forms of 
joint action are concerned, one is not acting for them and but from the group reason 
instead. 
 
But, having put forth the strong thesis seemingly excluding acting from proprietary reasons 
in paradigmatic joint action, Tuomela concedes that “in real life one often acts both for 
group reasons and private reasons when performing an action” (98; see also 130). What are 
we to make of this? Is the suggestion that group action is compatible with proprietary 
reasons? Or is it rather that there is a spectrum of cases? On the latter proposal, there are 
many instances of joint action involving both group and proprietary reasons, and to the 
extent that the motives are mixed, the case is not one of fully collective or joint action. If 
that’s the view, then it’s not quite a compatibilist thesis. Tuomela says, 
 
To think (e.g., believe, intend) or act in the we-mode is to think or act as a group 
member in a full sense, thus for a group reason. Thinking and acting in the we-mode 
expresses collective intentionality in its full sense. In contrast, to think or act in the I-
mode is to think or act as a private person—even if a group reason might 
contingently be at play. (Tuomela 2007,7) 
 
It’s the group reason and not the proprietary reason that has authority over what the agent 
does in joint action: 
 
Thinking and acting in the we-mode basically amounts to thinking and acting for a 
group reason, that is, to a group member’s taking the group’s views and 
commitments as his authoritative reasons for thinking and acting as the group 
“requires” or in accordance with what “favors” the group (namely, its goals, etc.). 
(Tuomela 2007, 14) 
 
…the we-mode was said to involve the idea of one’s functioning because of a group 
reason rather than a private reason. (Tuomela 2007, 47, emphasis added; see also a 
passage on 44-5 that similarly draws a contrast between acting on group vs. private 
reasons.)  
 
For Tuomela, then, any concession that allows for proprietary reasons would seem to be a 
falling away from some ideal of joint action. This is not really a proper compatibilism of the 
sort we find in Bratman – one that allows that some element of proprietary reason that does 
not in any way compromise joint action. (Indeed, a fully compatibilist view would insist that 
without some proprietary reason, there is the risk of losing the sense that we,a plurality, 
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share agency; joint action is not the doings of some monolithic individual agent.) Tuomela, 
in contrast, seems to favor a mixed view that allows that one might have proprietary 
reasons, but to the extent that one does, the action is less than fully joint.4 
 
What is it about a proper compatibilism that might put one off? Why does Tuomela think 
that to the extent that one is acting for the group reason, this is at odds with acting on a 
proprietary reason? There doesn’t seem to be anything in the very notion of acting for a 
reason that would rule out acting for multiple reasons. Why couldn’t one, in a case of joint 
action, have a proprietary reason, as well as a group reason, and act for both of them? To 
get a better sense of the sort of consideration that might move one away from 
compatibilism, let me turn to team reasoning. 
 
 
10.3. Incompatibilist Team Reasoning 
 
Team reasoning provides a solution to certain games (especially Hi-Lo) that pose difficulties 
for orthodox game theory. The details have been discussed extensively; what I want to 
emphasize here is that the proposed solution involves departing from the standard view that 
assumes that the only practical or deliberative perspective one can take is that of the 
individual: the only relevant locus of agency is the individual. Whereas, on the team 
reasoning proposal, each player thinks, not from her own perspective – where she asks, 
“What should I do, given what other players do?” – but from a larger, collective 
perspective, where she asks what we together should do. From this perspective it can be 
obvious what should be done; that is, it will be clear what the collective should do. If one can 
take on this point of view, then the thought is that this reasoning will give a straightforward 
answer regarding what one should do: namely, one’s part in the collective activity that the 
reasoning recommends.5  
 
I have some reservations regarding how team reasoning is implemented. In particular, I feel 
that standard presentations of it owe us more of an explanation of exactly when it is 
reasonable to use team reasoning. Moreover, the answer to this question had better not 
collapse into a form of individual reasoning.6 It will not be necessary, however, to address 
such worries here. I will take it for granted that some form of team reasoning is viable as a 
rational or normative theory, and that it’s distinctive – i.e. doesn’t collapse into a form of 
individual rationality. 
 
What is important for my purposes is the characterization of the intentions of participants 
in joint action in terms of the distinctive team reasoning that issues those intentions.  Gold 
and Sugden say 
 
                                                        
4 See a passage at Tuomela 2007, 101 that suggests the possibility of private or proprietary reasons. I take 
this not as evidence for a proper compatibilism but for the possibility of mixed cases that are less than fully 
ideal instances of joint action. 
5 There are many discussions of team reasoning, and some variety in what exactly is encompassed by the 
term. See Bacharach (2006), Sugden (1993), Gold and Sugden (2007), Anderson (2001) and Hurley (1989), as 
well as more recent discussion such as Pacherie (2018), Hakli, Miller and Tuomela (2010), and Roth (2012). 
6 Roth (2012). 
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Team reasoning was originally introduced to explain how, when individuals are 
pursuing collective goals, it can be rational to choose strategies that realize scope for 
common gain. But it also provides an account of the formation of collective 
intentions…It is natural to regard the intentions that result from team reasoning as 
collective intentions.” (Gold and Sugden 2007, 126)  
 
“It is an implication of our analysis that a given pattern of behavior can be intended 
either individually or collectively, depending on the reasoning which led to it.” 
(Gold and Sugden 2007, 128)  
  
So far, I’ve mentioned team reasoning and how collective intentions at the heart of joint 
action might be characterized in terms of such reasoning. It is not far now to the Exclusion 
Thesis – the thought that joint action is at odds with proprietary reasons. One idea we still 
need is that team reasoning is a way of gaining access to a type of reason for action – one 
that is had primarily by a group. Although the literature of team reasoning tends to present 
itself as a theory of reasoning rather than of reasons, it seems that when you take on the 
more expansive deliberative perspective demanded by this form of reasoning, you gain 
access and sensitivity to reasons or considerations that you otherwise would not have.7  For 
Gold and Sugden, an individual who engages in team reasoning starts from premises and 
concludes with an intention to perform his or her component of the joint action. Crucially, 
an individual “who accepts [these premises] and draws the inference ‘has a reason to form 
the intention to choose that component’ and presumably has a reason so to act.” (Gold and 
Sugden 2007, 126). 
 
Let me elaborate on this last remark. When one acts on an intention, one will be acting for 
the reasons that went into forming it. Take the case of an ordinary intention. When I 
decide to go for a bike ride this weekend, I usually have reasons for doing so: getting 
exercise, enjoying the weather, etc. The matter is now settled, so when the appropriate time 
comes, I don’t normally have to re-deliberate. I just go for the ride. Since I don’t have to 
deliberate at the time of action, I don’t necessarily have to think about the reasons in favor 
of going for a ride. Nevertheless, when I go for the ride, I’m doing so for reasons: normally, 
the reasons that went into my decision several days ago. Intentions thus serve 
to preserve reasons from a prior episode of decision making so that when one acts on the 
intention, one acts for those reasons. 
 
According to Gold and Sugden, collective intentions are formed by a distinctive kind of 
reasoning undertaken by an individual, one that involves taking on the perspective of a 
larger group of which the individual is a part. In so doing, one departs from the individual 
perspective; the reasons that one has access to in team reasoning needn’t correspond to 
those available in individual practical reasoning. There may be some overlap. Some 
considerations might be relevant from both perspectives. However, proprietary reasons won’t 
be retained at the collective level. (This just follows from their being proprietary.) If we 
follow Gold and Sugden in thinking that engaging in team reasoning leads to forming the 
relevant collective intention, then when one subsequently acts on that intention one is 
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acting for the distinctive collective or group reasons one accessed through team reasoning. 
Insofar as one is acting on the collective intention, one is not acting on proprietary reasons. 
 
In sum, if in joint action one is acting on collective intentions, then the distinctiveness of 
team reasoning ultimately explains why it is that in joint action one acts on group reasons 
to the exclusion of proprietary or personal reasons. Given the preservative role of intention 
and its origin of the intention in team reasoning, to act on the collective intention is to act 
for group reasons accessed through team reasoning, and not for proprietary reasons.8 
 
Suppose we agree at this point that when one acts on a collective intention stemming from 
team reasoning that one acts for the corresponding group or collective reasons. Might it be 
possible nevertheless to be acting on a proprietary reason as well? Even if the team 
reasoning offers a deliberative perspective that is different from individual perspective, and 
puts the agent in touch with reasons she would otherwise not have, why must this entail 
that she lose her handle on her proprietary reason? It’s quite possible that on some 
occasion, I can recognize that to engage in team reasoning and to act in accord with its 
recommendation can satisfy some proprietary reason of mine. (After all, in the Hi-Lo case, 
it is certainly in one’s personal interest to be able to coordinate on Hi-Hi.)9  So what stops 
me from acting on the proprietary reason as well? 
 
The worry is going to be something like this. To regard the matter of what to do from the 
deliberative perspective within which one’s proprietary reason has an exigent presence – 
and, moreover, to act from that perspective – is to distance oneself from the joint perspective 
from which the matter was supposedly settled. It is, perhaps, fine to recognize in the 
abstract that one may have proprietary reasons for engaging in joint activity. But if one is 
taking on the individual perspective to seek out the relevant proprietary reasons and to act 
                                                        
8On my understanding, intentions formed when one undertakes team reasoning are quite distinct from 
ordinary individual intentions. The origin of the former attitude makes an important difference, such as the 
fact that when one acts on the intention one acts for group reasons – reasons that are not necessarily 
available as such to one from the individual perspective. For a contrasting view of intentions resulting from 
team reasoning, see Kutz (2000). Kutz argues that joint action should be understood in terms of 
participatory intentions – an intention each participant has regarding his or her contribution to the 
collective action or outcome. Kutz argues for his participatory intention account of joint action in part by 
invoking team reasoning. But Kutz characterizes participatory intention as an ordinary individual intention, 
albeit with collective subject matter. I think that the upshot of my discussion is that Kutz is not entitled to 
this characterization of participatory intention; at the very least he needs to say more to justify it. 
Downstream causal/functional role might have tempted Kutz to disregard the difference in provenance 
between individual and collective intention. Consider for example snap judgment vs. judgment arrived at 
through deliberation and weighing of reasons. Both count as judgments presumably because of their 
downstream roles, despite their very different origins. However, both snap and deliberative judgments are 
subject to critical assessment by the same sorts of reasons or considerations. Whereas, individual and 
collective intentions arrived at through individual and team reasoning respectively seem not to be subject to 
assessments by the same standards or reasons; indeed, the point of team reasoning was to take on a 
perspective quite distinct from the individual perspective; indeed, to take up the individual perspective and 
to act from reasons from within that perspective, would undermine the commitment embodied in the 
collective intention stemming from team reasoning. (And if we were to ensure that the individual 
consideration were merely to ratify the collective intention, then it’s not clearly an efficacious consideration.) 
9 I’m setting aside the debate as to whether team reasoning might collapse into a form of individual 
reasoning. I will assume that it does not. Nevertheless, one might wonder whether one can for personal 
reasons become a team reasoner. 
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for those reasons, it seems that one’s grip on the collective reasons and team reasoning has 
become tenuous. In taking up the question of what, from an individual perspective, might 
be said in favor of or against acting in accord with team reasoning, is to re-litigate a matter 
that was supposed to have been settled through team reasoning and collective intention. It’s 
in this sense, then, that acting from proprietary reasons is in tension with acting on a 
collective intention derived from team reasoning. 
 
One might, nevertheless, wonder why one cannot on the basis of a proprietary reason undertake 
team reasoning and form the corresponding intention. And, in acting on it, couldn’t one 
also be acting for the proprietary reason that prompted the undertaking in the first place? I 
agree that proprietary reasons can be part of what explains much of what we do, including 
the undertaking of certain forms of reasoning. But a consideration that figures in the history 
that leads up to an action in this way is not necessarily a consideration that is a reason for 
so acting. It might help in explaining the conditions or circumstances under which one acts, 
but not necessarily the action itself. That’s to say that unlike the reasons-preserving process 
of acting on a prior intention, the process of undertaking team reasoning on the basis of 
proprietary reasons is not preservative, but transformative. 
 
Perhaps a familiar example would help. I might recognize that my selfish egoistic outlook is 
actually hindering my relationships with people and working against my own interests. So I 
decide for selfish reasons to give up on normative egoism, and become more altruistic. A 
selfish motivation might have led me to transform myself into someone who is not selfish. 
This does not mean that my altruistic acts are selfishly motivated. It means that selfishness 
had a role to play in my becoming non-selfish.10 Another example: I may have practical 
reasons for engaging in some form of theoretical reasoning. But this doesn’t mean that 
those practical considerations can count as reasons for the beliefs generated by that 
theoretical reasoning.  
 
If we are on the right track with this line of thought, then it would appear that an 
understanding of joint action that ties collective intention to team reasoning points to an 
incompatibility between joint action and proprietary reason. 
 
 
10.4. Accommodating Subordinate Proprietary Reasons 
 
Is there, nevertheless, a way for the team reasoning conception of joint action to 
countenance participants acting on proprietary reasons? In one sense, the answer is easy, as 
we’ve already seen: the mixed view allows that there are proprietary reasons – with the 
upshot, however, that the action is less than fully joint. But there remains the intuition that 
joint action at least in some circumstances is perfectly compatible with proprietary 
reasons.11  Moreover, it’s unclear how joint action could be sustained or stable 
                                                        
10 Parfit (1984) argues that the fact that an egoist might have reasons to become altruistic is not an 
argument against egoism. This may be right. However, I don’t think that this shows that one’s actions 
subsequent to the transformation are done for egoistic reasons. 
11 And indeed, proprietary reasons might be necessary if we’re to avoid turning joint action into monolithic 
individual agency. 
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if nothing could be said in favor of the joint effort from the personal or proprietary point of 
view. It is likely, after all, that participants in joint activity – especially when it is long 
term – will on some occasion fall into an individual perspective regarding what they are 
doing. It is unrealistic and likely undesirable (stifling and oppressive) to think that the team 
or group perspective of the collective intention can never loosen its grip on the agent’s 
practical point of view.12 Indeed, joint activity is often engaged in precisely because it serves 
the individual interests of the individuals involved. Given the ever-present possibility of 
seeing things from the perspective of the individual agent, we might welcome the possibility 
that sometimes that perspective could be taken within the context of joint activity. So it 
would be worthwhile for one who places team reasoning at the center of her account of 
joint action to investigate this possibility. 
 
The case of competitive games is suggestive.13 This is a form of joint activity, and yet when 
you and I engage in it, much of what I do is aimed at winning against you. This is a reason 
not shared with you, so it seems to be proprietary.14 But it is a proprietary reason that is, 
nevertheless, very much a part of engaging in that sort of joint activity. We might speak of 
such proprietary reasons as constitutive of the particular joint yet competitive activity in 
question.15 
 
But what about non-competitive activity? Is it possible to act on proprietary reasons in such 
contexts? Notice that someone might be engaged in a non-competitive joint action, and yet 
have his own reasons for what he’s doing. For example, how well he contributes to some 
joint effort will have reputational effects (how good a team player is he?), and open up 
possibilities for collaborations not only with current partners, but with other partners as well. 
Another example: a particular task falls to me in the context of joint activity; there are 
several ways of doing it all perfectly adequate, but I choose one because it is particularly 
enjoyable for me, or because doing it that way will afford me an opportunity to develop 
skills or know-how useful for me in projects outside of the joint activity. Thus, an agent 
might have reasons for how he conducts himself within the joint action that are not shared 
with other participants in joint activity: it needn’t be one of your aims in joint action that I 
gain a good reputation and secure future opportunities.16 So long as the current activity is 
not undermined or compromised by being motivated by such perks, it seems that this is an 
instance of a proprietary reason for what I’m doing in joint action. 
                                                        
12 This is not to say that sometimes you don’t want this perspective, as in the case of temptation. 
13 Searle (1990). 
14 If you are also aiming for me to win, then you are not in the fullest sense playing this game. 
15 Some might be tempted to think that one cannot even act on such a proprietary reason (defined in terms 
of the aim of winning against you) outside the framework established by some joint activity. But can I not 
have this reason and act on it outside such a framework? After all, might it explain why I seek to play the 
game with you? This is indeed a proprietary reason, but it’s not clear that this is the reason one is acting on 
when one is really playing the game. I want to beat you at a game. And this might explain why I seek out the 
opportunity, and why I engage in it. But when we play the game – really play it together – then it’s no 
longer clear that this is the relevant reason that explains my particular moves within the game. It seems now 
that I have a new framework defined goal and reason for action.  It’s a mistake to run together reasons inside 
and outside the framework of the game, even if they are superficially similar. 
At least, this is true for joint activity engaged in through team reasoning. There may be forms of joint 
action that are more individualistic and don’t require team reasoning. 
16 Though I might explicitly take on this end.  
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Does this contradict what I said earlier about the incompatibility of team and individual 
reasoning? I don’t think so. The proprietary reason in question only figures as a reason for 
how one acts within a framework established by the team reasoning that leads to collective 
intention and joint activity. In particular, one needn’t think that in participating in joint 
action in the first place one is acting on that proprietary reason. Moreover, the proprietary 
reason is one that promotes one’s engagement in the joint activity in question; after all, it’s 
a consideration for being a good team player, or encourages one to do one’s part with 
greater relish. Such a proprietary reason is not constitutive in the sense introduced above in 
connection with competitive games. But it would be natural to regard such proprietary 
reasons as permitted or sanctioned and, along with those that are constitutive, entirely 
compatible with joint action. 
 
In sum, the fundamental idea here is that team reasoning conception of collective intention 
is supposed to settle the matter of one’s participation in joint action. This committal 
element of the collective intention (along with the idea that intentions serve to transmit 
reasons) entails that when one acts on the collective intention, one is acting for collective 
reasons, not the proprietary reasons. To act on the individual intention and for proprietary 
reasons implies that the matter of whether to engage in the joint action has been reopened 
even though no relevant defeater has been triggered; this would undermine the committal 
element of the collective intention. 
 
The only sort of proprietary reason that one could act on in a way that is compatible with 
the committal force of collective intention would be those that are subordinate to the 
collective reason. In contrast, one cannot act for what we might refer to 
as coordinating proprietary reasons – that is, those proprietary reasons that are not 
subordinate, but stand alongside of the collective or group reason (in favor of the joint 
activity). Thus, although the team reasoning conception of joint action is fully compatible 
with some proprietary reasons, this accommodation is significantly circumscribed and 
limited to subordinate reasons. 
 
 
10.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
I hope to have articulated certain underappreciated aspects of the team reasoning 
conception of collective intention that suggest that acting on non-subordinate proprietary 
reasons is incompatible with fully joint action. Some might find this to be a problematic 
upshot of the team reasoning view of collective intention. I will not try to assess whether 
this amounts to a serious critique of the view. At the very least, it points toward the 
distinctiveness of the team reasoning view. There is a significant chasm between this view 
and theories of joint action that are more reductive in seeing collective intentions as a form 
of individual intention – and thus are friendlier to the possibility of proprietary reasons. 
 
I want to turn finally to implications for more minimal joint action. There are different 
respects in which one might imagine joint action or shared agency to be minimal. For 
example, one might imagine participants that are quite incompetent in coordinating with 
one another. Although each is very much committed to a joint project, one can imagine 
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that their collective bumbling would at best merit the label of minimally joint action if it 
counts as joint at all. 
 
Another sense of minimality is closer to the concerns of this paper. Joint action might be 
minimal insofar as it is very opportunistic. Each participant finds it in her interest to 
cooperate because of a highly contingent circumstances. Individuals might have very 
divergent goals, but circumstances happen to be such that some immediate aim serves the 
purposes of each. As soon as circumstances change, cooperation ceases in part because no 
other aim is shared so as to serve as a further focal point for sustained interaction. Joint 
action can thus be minimal in the sense of being more contingent, more opportunistic, and 
less stable. Correspondingly, one might imagine joint action being more robust, stable, and 
sustained the more reasons are shared, with fewer proprietary reasons that figure as reasons 
for joint action. 
 
That, I think, is an intuitive way to understand at least one way in which joint actions might 
range from the minimal to the robust. But if what we’ve been saying about the team 
reasoning conception of collective intention and joint action is on the right track, then this 
view doesn’t offer a dimension along which we find a gradient from minimal to robust 
forms of joint action. It would therefore make no sense to talk of minimal forms of joint 
action. As soon as proprietary reasons of the coordinating, non-subordinate variety figure 
as reasons for which one is acting, one is no longer genuinely acting with others. On the 
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